



Secure your
Software

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1. Landscape
2. Value proposal & offer
3. Stories from our customers
4. Examples

What is this?



It is a matter of

confidence

Main domains of interest

Telecom



Rail



Internet of things



Space



Industry




Defense



Aeronautics




Energy



Cyber Security



Threats



Mafia,
Nation-states
with huge
resources

Solutions

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TrustInSoft unique value proposal



safety & security
guarantees for
software components



cybersecurity



nuclear industry



aeronautics

Three offers



Advanced Software Security Audits

We do the job for you



License of TRUST **IN** SOFT ANALYZER

You use our technology



Expertise

*Training, support,
On demande verification*

State-of-the-art source code analyzer



1

Your software

3

User inspects all threats

The screenshot displays the TrustInSoft - Analyzer interface, which is used for inspecting source code for threats. The interface is divided into several panes:

- Global list:** Shows a list of global variables and functions. The search filter is set to "parse_a".
- Current Statement:** Displays the current statement being analyzed, which is a function call: `logid = (char const *)strchr((char const *)*(argv + 1), logid);`. The statement is highlighted in green.
- Watch Statements:** A table showing the current statement and its context. The table has columns for "Fu...", "Kind", "ID", and "Statement".
- Show defs' Statements:** A table showing the definitions of the variables used in the current statement. The table has columns for "Fu...", "Kind", "ID", and "Statement".
- Tracked Statements:** A table showing the tracked statements. The table has columns for "Fu...", "Kind", "ID", and "Statement".
- Functions Context:** A table showing the context of the current function. The table has columns for "Kind" and "Function".
- Current Function:** Displays the current function being analyzed, which is `rte_eal_init`.
- Function: pthread_self:** Displays the definition of the `pthread_self` function.
- Value Plugin:** A table showing the value of the variables. The table has columns for "Kind" and "Function".
- Information:** A table showing the information about the current statement. The table has columns for "Term", "Before", and "After".

The main pane shows the source code of the `rte_eal_init` function. The code is annotated with various symbols (circles and squares) indicating the presence of threats. The threats are highlighted in red and green. The threats are:

- `logid = (char const *)strchr((char const *)*(argv + 1), logid);` (highlighted in green)
- `thread_id = pthread_self();` (highlighted in green)
- `if (tmp_1 < 0) {` (highlighted in green)
- `rte_panic("rte_eal_init", "Cannot init early logs");` (highlighted in red)
- `tmp_2 = rte_eal_cpu_init();` (highlighted in green)
- `if (tmp_2 < 0) {` (highlighted in green)
- `rte_panic("rte_eal_init", "Cannot detect lcores");` (highlighted in red)
- `exit(1);` (highlighted in red)

The bottom pane shows the "Evaluate ACSL Terms" table, which contains the following data:

Term	Before	After
<code>tmp_0 local var. (char const *)</code>	<code>∈ { NULL ; &S_0_S_argv[0], [1], [2] }</code>	Same as before
<code>main@11902</code>	<code>∈ { NULL ; &S_0_S_argv[0], [1], [2] }</code>	Same as before
<code>*argv (char *)</code>	<code>∈ { NULL ; &S_0_S_argv[0] }</code>	Same as before

2

All possible places for a kind of threat

An example



This is the world first widely used SSL stack guaranteed without buffer overflows

Polar SSL is a piece of software which enables secure transactions like HTTPS for instance

Just acquired by

ARM

Using **TRUST IN SOFT ANALYZER** we now have a report which tells how to compile, configure and deploy Polar SSL in order to be immune against all attacks caused by CWE 119 to 127, 369, 415, 416, 457, 476, 562, 690.

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You use SSL cryptography

- You can get the right configuration for your SSL stack so that your system can no be hacked by a classic attack.
- You can also sponsor other open source components which are critical for you. (IPSec stack ,...)

Eradicate run time errors

- You subcontracted a piece of C software
- You want to make sure the subcontracted software has no runtime errors (Buffer overflow, invalid pointer usage, division by zero, non initialized memory read, dangling pointer, arithmetic overflow, NaN in a float computation, overflow in float to integer conversion).
- You or your subcontractor can use TrustInSoft Solutions to eradicate run-time errors.

Production system which crashes

- A router uses a modified versions of the linux kernel with specific queueing policy.
- The systems happens to crash sometimes.
- We where able in 2 hours to locate the problem in the linux kernel module.

Master your multithreaded software development

- You have designed a multi threaded software.
- You want to be confident in the fact that there are no race conditions and no unexpected shared variables.
- Our solutions can help you automate the verification, or we can do it for you.

Quality beyond marketing

- You know you design high quality software.
- You want to prove that you are better than your competitors.
- TrustInSoft helps you highlight the quality of your products.



TRUST  SOFT
VERIFIED

High level benefits

1

Prove that your products
are safe & secure


→ to your customers

→ to national authorities

2

Anticipate cybersecurity
regulation

Let's collaborate now!



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Valgrind Comparison

Valgrind comparison

- Valgrind is a popular Open Source tool used to find memory faults in program
- We present in the following slides three comparisons with Valgrind
- Some companies use Rational Purify, a widespread tool similar to Valgrind

The following code has an error: address of variable b is used outside of its scope

```
int main () {  
    int * my_int= (int*)0;  
    {  
        int b=314;  
        my_int = &b;  
    }  
    *my_int=22;  
    return 0;  
}
```

Valgrind :

No error mentioned

TrustInSoft :

locals {b} escaping the scope of a block of main through my_int

TrustInSoft vs. Valgrind 2-0

The following code has an error:
array b is accessed from a

```
int a[10] = {1,1,1,1};  
int b[10] = {2,2,2,2};
```


```
int main () {  
    a[16]=3;  
    return b[0];  
} // returns 3
```

Valgrind:


No error mentioned

TrustInSoft:

Writing out of bounds
at index 16



TrustInSoft abstract memory model



TrustInSoft vs. Valgrind 3-0

Source code of a virtual machine which computes 2^4

value of B
not checked

```
#define ARRAY_SIZE 11
unsigned char mem[ARRAY_SIZE]= \
    {80,7,5,5,3,5,3,5,4,11,2};
#define NEXT \
    if (pos<ARRAY_SIZE-1) ++pos;
break;

int main () {
    unsigned int A=0,B=0,pos=0;
    pos=0;
    while (1) {
        switch (mem[pos] & 7) {
            // add
            case 0: A+=mem[pos]>>3; NEXT;
            // subtract
            case 1: A-=mem[pos]>>3; NEXT;
```

```
        // load
        case 2: A=mem[B]; NEXT;
        //store
        case 3: mem[B]=A; NEXT;
        // exit
        case 4: return A;
        // load and add
        case 5: if (B<ARRAY_SIZE)
            A=A+mem[B]; NEXT;
        // goto A
        case 6: if (A<ARRAY_SIZE)
            pos=A; break;
        // swap A and B
        case 7: {int tmp=B;B=A;A=tmp;}
            NEXT;
        }
        if (++pos==ARRAY_SIZE) pos=0;
    } }
```

All virtual machines with memory size of 11

```
#define ARRAY_SIZE 11
unsigned char mem[ARRAY_SIZE] = {80,7,5,5,3,5,3,5,4,11,2};
#define NEXT if (pos<ARRAY_SIZE-1) ++pos;\
    break;

int main () {
    unsigned int A=0,B=0,pos=0;
    while (1) {
        // . . .
```

Here is the program
for a given state of the virtual
machine
This program runs without error

```
#define ARRAY_SIZE 11
unsigned char mem[ARRAY_SIZE];
#define NEXT \
    if (pos<ARRAY_SIZE-1) ++pos; break;

int main () {
    unsigned int A=0,B=0,pos=0;
    for (pos=0;pos<ARRAY_SIZE;++pos) mem[pos]=Frama_C_interval(0, 255);
    pos=0;
    while (1) {
        // . . .
```

TrustInSoft Analyzer
tests all possible virtual machine
of size 11.
256¹¹ tests.
In a single run.

Symbolic value: all integers
between 0 and 255



Comparison with other static analyzers

Competitors

- Other static analyzer (Coverity, Fortify) are not able to bring guarantees on the source code
- For this reason TrustInSoft Analyzer was the only technology able to pass the NIST SATE V Ockham Criteria



Eradicated weaknesses

Standard vulnerabilities:

- Buffer overflow, invalid pointer usage, division by zero, non initialized memory read, dangling pointer, arithmetic overflow, NaN in a float computation, overflow in float to integer conversion,

Other vulnerabilities:

- CWE-078: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
- CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials
CWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
CWE-807: Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
- CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
CWE-022: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
- CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
- CWE-676: Use of Potentially Dangerous Function

- CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
- CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
- CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
- CWE-134: Uncontrolled Format String
- CWE-759: Use of a One-Way Hash without a Salt
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
- CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
- CWE-838: Inappropriate Encoding for Output Context
- CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
- CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow
- CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
- CWE-209: Information Exposure Through an Error Message
- ...

Advanced security properties

Validation of security properties

- TrustInSoft can specify properties on software.
An example is shown on a toy example for cryptography where only public data shall be sent on a network
- This methodology can be adapted to match your security requirements

Specification of security properties as a comment or in a separate file

1

```
/*@ ensures security_state(*x) == public () */  
void crypt(int *x);  
  
/*@ requires security_state(x) == public() */  
void send(int x);  
  
int c;           // by default c is private  
  
void f() {  
    int y = 1;    // by default y is private  
    int z = (int /*@ public */) 0; // z is I  
                                   // public  
    crypt(&y);    // y becomes public  
    if (c) y = z;  
    send(y);     // dependency on c which is  
                 // private !!! Error !!!  
}
```

2 *Error found*

Contact info



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